

CHAPTER XVII.

ATTEMPT AT ORGANIZING WALLA WALLA COUNTY, W. T., DEFEATED BY INDIAN OUTBREAK OF 1855.

The first legislative body assembling in the Territory of Washington created sixteen counties, among which was Walla Walla, with the following as its boundaries: Commencing its line on the north bank of the Columbia, at a point opposite the mouth of Des Chutes river, it ran thence north to the forty-ninth parallel; and took in all of Washington Territory between this line and the Rocky mountains. It included what now is northern Idaho and northern Montana, most of Klikitat and Yakima counties, and all of Stevens, Spokane, Whitman, Columbia, Garfield, and Walla Walla counties.

The want of population within this immense area, rendered necessary its attachment to Skamania county (which lay directly to the west) for judicial purposes; and included it in the first judicial district, to which Judge Obadiah B. McFadden was assigned. In connection with Skamania and Clarke counties, it was allowed one member in the Legislative Assembly; the county seat being located by the act "on the land claim of Lloyd Brooke," the old Whitman mission.

That first Legislature, of 1854, closed its efforts for Walla Walla county in the following words: "That George C. Bumford, John Owens, and A. Dominique Pambrun be, and they are hereby constituted and appointed the Board of County Commissioners; and that Narcises Remond be, and is hereby appointed sheriff; and that Lloyd Brooke be, and is hereby appointed Judge of Probate, and shall have jurisdiction as Justice of the Peace; all in and for the county of Walla Walla." Some of these officials never knew of the honor that had been cast at their feet; and Mr. Pambrun, in 1882, insisted to the writer, that hitherto he had been ignorant of this early application to himself of Shakespeare's fancy, when he wrote that, "Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them." None of these parties acted officially in the positions to which they were chosen; and their appointment, in a region including less than a dozen American citizens outside of those employed by the missionaries, was a legislative absurdity.

The farcical form of extinguishing the Indian title to any portion of this section had not yet been enacted, and but little inducement up to this time, had developed for it. The acquisition of land presented limited attraction to men for settling in the region lying between the Rocky and Cascade mountains north of the forty-sixth par-

allel, when it could be had for the taking nearer the centers of civilization. A greater loadstone was needed to draw white men to the country, than a meagre opportunity to gain a title to the soil from a government that did not possess it, when to do so would possibly consign the seeker to a Whitman's fate. As yet, the Indian was comparatively secure in his Walla Walla home, for the white man had met with little temptation at this time to take it from him. It was a state of things doomed to a brief existence, however, for there lay concealed in her mountain gulches and streams that which, when found, would furnish a motive to signal the beginning of an end to their occupation of the country.

The ensuing January (in 1855) the Territorial Legislature essayed once more to organize this county, comparatively void of any but an Indian population, and, on the twenty-fourth of that month, by statute,¹ the following named became its officers:

Probate Judge—Lloyd Brooke.

County Auditor—Lloyd Brooke.

County Treasurer—Lloyd Brooke.

County Sheriff—Shirley Ensign.

Justice of Peace—George C. Bumford.

County Commissioners—John Owens, George C. Bumford, John F. Noble.

Walla Walla county was also authorized to elect two representatives to the Territorial Legislature. Under this appointment none of the gentlemen qualified, and the county organization was forced to continue its embryo existence; but the time for an awakening and a change had come.

DISCOVERY OF INDUCEMENT FOR WHITE OCCUPATION, FOLLOWED BY INDIAN TREATIES.

In March, about two months after the passage of this official appointment act, *gold was discovered* in the Pend d'Oreille or Clarke's river where it empties into the Columbia. The discoverer, a half-breed named Wau-ka, was a resident of French Prairie, Oregon. He returned to the Willamette valley with specimens to exhibit and aid in causing his tale of a new El Dorado found, to create a sensation west of the Cascade mountains. No one knew better than Gov. I. I. Stevens the probable result of a gold excitement, and he hastened to enter into treaties with the various Indian tribes, whose quiet was likely to be disturbed by a rush of whites through, or into, their country. Accordingly, on the ninth of June, 1855, three months after gold was discovered, he procured the signing of treaties with seventeen tribes, ceding to our government all of the country, except the present Umatilla and Yakima reservations, embraced within the following limits: Commencing on the Columbia river between White Salmon and Wind rivers near the Cascades; thence northerly along the ridge of the Cascade range to a point near the line of the British possessions, where the waters divide between Methow and Lake Chelan rivers; thence southeasterly, crossing the Columbia river a few miles below Fort Okinagan; from where the average direction was continued southeasterly to the head waters of Palouse river. Thence the direction was southerly to the mouth of Tukannon creek, up which the line ran to its headwaters; thence to the ridge of the Blue mountains, down which southwesterly the line

¹ Statutes of 1854 and 1855, page 36.

continued to Powder river in Union county, Oregon; thence northwesterly to Willow creek, down that stream to its mouth in the Columbia river; from where the line ran down the Columbia to the place of beginning.

The area thus lost to the Indians was a little over 29,000 square miles, or a trifle of a few hundred thousand acres more than is contained in a tract 138 miles wide by 210 long, for which they were to be paid as follows: The fourteen tribes termed the "Yakima Nation," including the Palouse Indians, all of whom lived north of the Columbia and Snake rivers, with *Kama-i-akun* as head chief, were to be given \$200,000. This was to be paid in yearly installments, during the first five \$10,000, the next five \$8,000, then \$6,000 for five years, and for the last five \$4,000 were to be paid annually, payments to commence in September, 1856. This left \$60,000, which were to be expended in getting these tribes on to their reservation, for fitting it up and to aid them in learning the art of husbandry. In addition to this the head chief of the nation was to have a house built for him, with ten acres of land inclosed and plowed, and he was to be paid \$500 per year for twenty years as a salary. To the Indians generally this was a glittering temptation, but *Kama-i-akun* was hostile to the transaction and used his influence against it without avail. From that time until his death, he was never friendly to the whites, and later, withdrew from the war-path against them only for want of followers. Fourteen chiefs in all signed this agreement, among whom was the unwilling *Kama-i-akun*.

The Walla Wallas, Cayuses and Umatillas occupied the country bounded on the east and south by the Tukannon creek and Blue mountains, on the west by Willow creek and north by the Columbia and Snake rivers. They were to be paid \$100,000 for their birth-right, with a twenty years annuity of \$500 to the head chief of each of those tribes. But for the stain upon their hands of the blood of a murdered Whitman, these three tribes would not have sold their country to the whites. The Cayuses, remembering that scene of butchery at the mission in 1847, believed the spirits of the murdered whites were Cayuse banshees bringing misfortune upon their tribe, and they yielded. The Umatillas knowing they were not guiltless in that affair, and looking to the reward offered for compliance, placed their names to the treaty. The Walla Wallas, too weak for resistance, reluctantly joined in the transfer of their homes, and thirty-six chiefs from among the three tribes, signed the conveyance. *Peu-peu-mox-mox*, chief of this last mentioned tribe, was sullen, and would not talk. He remembered that his own son had been educated at the mission; had visited California by invitation of Capt. J. A. Sutter; that he had been as wantonly and maliciously murdered while in that gentleman's fort, as had been Dr. Whitman among the Cayuses, and he no longer courted their friendship or believed in their promises. A special clause was placed in the treaty giving this chief permission to build a trading post at or near the mouth of the Yakima river, which he could occupy for five years and trade with whites going to the mines. He was to be paid his first year's salary on the day he signed the treaty, and the other chiefs had to wait. A house was to be built for his living son, around which five acres of land were to be plowed and inclosed, and he was to be paid annually one hundred dollars for twenty years. In addition to all this, *Peu-peu-mox-mox* was to be given within three months, "three yokes of oxen, three yokes and four chains, one wagon, two plows, twelve hoes, twelve

axes, two shovels, one saddle and bridle, one set of wagon harness, and one set of plow harness." None of the other chiefs received promise of like privileges or payments, and it is a striking evidence of the necessity that existed for obtaining the influence of this evident leader among the tribes at the council.

Within six months from that time he was captured by the whites under a flag of truce; was killed while a prisoner; his hands, ears, and scalp were sent to Oregon as war trophies: and, after burial, his skull was dug up and broken in pieces for distribution as souvenirs of *what?*

The two treaties were signed on the ninth of June, 1855, at Camp Stevens within the limits of what now is Walla Walla city. Then the Governor, and Joel Palmer the Oregon Indian agent, opened negotiations with the Nez Percés, who had been present since the gathering of the tribes at this great council. On the eleventh of that same month these old and tried friends of the Americans, who had been one of the strong powers to influence the other tribes to cede their lands in the two treaties of the ninth, conveyed their immense domain to our government, withholding a rather extensive reserve. Their territory, about one-fourth of which was retained, included over 18,000 square miles; and they were to be paid for it in annuities through a term of twenty years, a total of \$200,000. In addition, the head chief was to be paid \$500 per year for twenty years, and the tribe was to receive other benefits tending towards civilization. Fifty-eight chiefs signed it, among whom were *Lawyer*, *Looking Glas* and *Joseph*.

At the close of this council at Walla Walla, which would probably have proved a slaughter instead of treaty-ground for the whites, had it not been for the friendship of the Nez Percés, Governor Stevens started for Colville accompanied by a few Americans and a body-guard from this tribe. The Indians in that region refused to sell their lands. The Governor passed over the Bitter Root range of mountains and concluded a treaty with the Flat Head Nation on the sixteenth of July, by which they ceded over 20,000 square miles of territory to the government, less a reservation. The tribes constituting the Flathead Nation included the Flathead, Kootenai, and Upper Pend d'Oreilles. In addition to the \$200,000 there was to be a \$500 salary paid to the head chief of each of those tribes annually for twenty years, and the other usual advances to the nation for educational and agricultural purposes. Over this nation the Catholic missionaries had an almost unlimited control, and, had they opposed it, no treaty could have been effected. From among the Flatheads Governor Stevens passed beyond the Rocky mountains to treat with the Blackfeet, where for the present, we will leave him and follow the course of events in the Columbia river country.

When the treaties had been signed at the Walla Walla council and Governor Stevens had started north, Joel Palmer returned to the Dalles, where he induced the three bands of Wascoes, the Lower De Chutes, Upper De Chutes, Tenino and John Day River Walla Wallas, to cede their lands to the government on the twenty-fifth of June, for \$150,000. Payment was to be divided into annuities that would reach that amount in twenty years, with salaries to chiefs and advances for improvements, similar to those contained in the other treaties. The land ceded by these five tribes, from which should be deducted their reservation, included over 16,000 square miles.

GROWING HOSTILITY AMONG THE TRIBES AND ITS CAUSE.

In each of the treaties was inserted the following clause: "*This treaty shall be obligatory upon the contracting parties as soon as the same shall be ratified by the President and Senate of the United States.*" None of them were ratified by the United States Senate until March 8, 1859. None of the ceded territory was open legally for white settlement until the government had accepted it from the Indians by such ratification; and the treaties were binding upon *neither party* prior to this event.

This wholesale attempt to take these lands from the tribes naturally stirred up among them a wide-spread feeling of dissatisfaction. The chiefs had signed it away, but had done so reluctantly; and then had left the great council ground sullen and dissatisfied, to go among their people and tell them what had transpired. At the same time gold seekers had commenced to traverse the country on their way from east of the Cascades to the Colville mines. This served as an element of excitement to stir up the already fermenting feeling of hostility among the Indians, whose leaders could see as plainly as could the whites, that it was the beginning of the end of their race. The young braves asked to be led against their natural enemies, and, as the head chiefs could give no satisfactory answer to their demand, the result that followed was inevitable.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR OF 1855 AND 1856.

On the twenty-second of September, 1855, in the absence of Governor Stevens from the capital on his treaty expedition east of the Rocky mountains, C. H. Mason, the acting Governor, wrote to Major G. J. Raines in command of the regulars, that he had just learned of the murder of a man named Mattice by the Yakima Indians. The murdered man was a resident of Olympia, and had been killed on his way to the Colville mines, when traversing the country occupied by that tribe. Seven others were reported killed; and as some thirty persons from the vicinity of Seattle were known to be passing through that region, in parties of from two to four, the Major was asked to send a military force to protect them and punish the aggressors. Four days later, Governor Mason addressed Major Raines at Fort Vancouver, notifying him that on the fourteenth of September two citizens of Olympia, named — Walker and — Jameson had been shot by Yakima Indians, from an ambush near where the Natchess trail crossed the Yakima river. The communication further states as follows:

"This tribe and its kindred branches having entered into treaty stipulations with the United States to preserve amity with all American citizens, and in defiance of such obligations having taken the first opportunity to cut off straggling parties, I immediately upon receipt of the last information, made a requisition upon Capt. M. Maloney, commanding Fort Steilacoom, for a detachment of the troops under his command, to proceed as soon as possible to the point in question, both to punish the Yakima tribe, and to furnish protection to such persons as may be traveling through that country. This requisition has been complied with, and on Thursday (September 27), a detachment of forty men, with forty days' provisions will start, under command of Lieutenant W. A. Slaughter. In order more fully to carry out the objects intended and to effect permanent results, I have to request that the suggestion in my letter of September 22, be carried out and that a detachment of troops be sent either from Vancouver or the Dalles, as soon as possible to co-operate with those sent from Steilacoom."

The following is the reply of Major Raines to this communication, and thus the war of 1855 and 1856 was inaugurated.¹

"GOVERNOR—Your letter by Mr. Pearson I have the honor to acknowledge, and have ordered into the field, a company of eighty-four men from Fort Dalles, O. T., all mounted, and with provisions on pack mules for one month, to proceed without delay and sweep through the Yakima country to the points you indicated, co-operating with the force from Steilacoom; also, to inquire into the safety of Agent Bolan, who has now been absent an unusual length of time; a respectful attention to whose views are enjoined—if alive—for there are grounds to fear otherwise.

"I shall approve of the action of the commanding officer at Fort Steilacoom in the premises, and only regret that the forty men under Lieutenant Slaughter were not a full company. I have also located an officer and twenty men at the Cascades."

In the meantime the Indian Agent A. J. Bolan had been brutally murdered; but his fate was yet an uncertainty, when Major G. O. Haller marched north into the hostile region from the Dalles, October 3, with five officers, one hundred and two men and a mountain howitzer, to co-operate with Lieutenant Slaughter from Fort Steilacoom. On the sixth of October, his command met the Indians in force on the Simcoe creek, and, after a temporary success, in which by a charge they dislodged the enemy from the brush along that stream, were forced to abandon it and take to an adjacent hill. Here the troops were surrounded, but Major Haller succeeded in sending a courier back to Vancouver for reinforcements. Before assistance could reach him, his command met with a disastrous repulse and were driven out of the Indian country with serious loss.

A CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Immediately upon receipt of the dispatch announcing the reverse, Major Rains requested acting Governor Mason to furnish two companies of volunteers to assist in chastising the enemy. On the same day, October 9, he addressed Gov. George L. Curry of Oregon as follows:

"GOVERNOR: " * * * "This morning, Lieut. Day, of Artillery, leaves Fort Dalles to join Maj. Haller's command with about 45 men and 1 mountain howitzer.

"As commanding officer, I have ordered all the United States disposable force in this district into the field immediately, and shall take the command.

"As this force is questionable to subdue these Indians—the Yakimas, Klikitats, and may be some other smaller bands—I have the honor to call upon you for four companies of volunteers, composed according to our present organization of 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 74 privates. This number of companies is just enough for a major's command, and would authorize that officer also.

"We have only arms enough at this post for two companies—so it is advisable to have two

¹ Mrs. F. F. Victor, writing of the cause leading to this war, on pages 506 and 507 in her book, entitled, "The River of the West," states that:

"But when at last the call to arms was made in Oregon, it was an opportunity sought and not an alternative forced upon them, by the politicians of that Territory. The occasion was simply this: A party of lawless wretches from the Sound Country passing over the Cascade mountains into the Yakima Valley, on their way to the Upper Columbia mines, found some Yakima women digging roots in a lonely place and abused them. The women fled to their village and told the chiefs of the outrage, and a party followed the guilty whites and killed several of them in a fight.

"Mr. Bolin, the Indian sub-agent for Washington, went to the Yakima village, and, instead of judging the case impartially, made use of threats in the name of the United States Government, saying that an army should be sent to punish them for killing his people. On his return home, Mr. Bolin was followed and murdered.

"The murder of an Indian agent was an act which could not be overlooked. Very properly the case should have been taken notice of in a manner to convince the Indians that murder must be punished. But, tempted by an opportunity for gain, and encouraged by the somewhat reasonable fears of the white population of Washington and Oregon, Governor G. L. Curry, of the latter, at once proclaimed war, and issued a call for volunteers, without waiting for the sanction or assistance of the general Government."

of the four companies come armed with rifles, or such arms as can best be obtained. We have plenty of ammunition, however. As celerity is the word, we want as many of the volunteers as can be immediately obtained, to rendezvous at this post, and proceed with the troops to Fort Dalles. They can be mustered here.

"I am sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,

"G. J. RAINES, *Maj. 4th Infantry, Com'd'g.*"

Governor Mason at once called for volunteers as requested, and Governor Curry issued a proclamation on the eleventh of October, asking of his constituents eight mounted companies for service during the war, which was followed in a few days by a call for two more, and, on the eighteenth of that month the first of them, armed and equipped, reached the Dalles at the front.

Close upon the heels of the Yakima disaster came news of an Indian massacre in Southern Oregon, where the Rogue River savages had inaugurated war. More troops were necessary for the emergency, and Governor Curry issued another proclamation, dated October 15, asking for nine additional mounted companies to operate in the direction of the new danger. It was a grave and critical position, such as called for the exercise of prompt, decisive action, controlled by wise counsel, executed with cool and unflinching courage. Such had thus far marked the action of the two Governors and the officer commanding in the field. Another disaster, like that befalling Major Haller in the Yakima country, would ignite a flame of war from the line of California to the British possessions, both east and west of the Cascade mountains.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CONDITION OF THE THREATENED COUNTRY.

A glance over the field affected by this Indian outbreak is necessary for a proper appreciation of the necessities for an extensive, general, and prompt action of the military forces. By this time it had become known to the whites throughout the northwest that a general Indian war was imminent, and those living in isolated or unprotected localities were seeking greater safety by concentration or abandonment of the country. Besides the miners, there were living east of the Cascades at that time, the following persons, whose lives would be endangered by a general outbreak.

RESIDENTS EAST OF THE CASCADES AT THE TIME, NOT EX-HUDSON'S BAY MEN.

HENRY M. CHASE first came, in the latter part of 1851, with William McKay to Umatilla river, where he wintered. The next summer he joined William Craig in

the Nez Perces' country, wintered in 1852 at the Dalles, returned to the Nez Perce country in 1853, where he remained with his stock, purchased from emigrants, until 1855, when he became a resident of what is now Dayton. At present he is living in Walla Walla city.

LOUIS RABOIN, an American of French extraction, who had been living in the country east of the Cascades since 1851, and in 1855 lived at the place now known as Marengo on the river Tukannon.

P. M. LAFONTAIN, a neighbor of Mr. Chase in 1855, adjoining whom he had taken up a claim, had been a resident since 1852.

LLOYD BROOKE, GEORGE C. BUMFORD, and JOHN F. NOBLE were partners, and had occupied the Whitman mission since 1853. They had come to the country and selected that point for headquarters in the fall of 1852, intending to make it the centre of a grazing region, over which their stock could range; and they still occupied the place in 1855. Mr. Brooke is now residing in Portland, Oregon, in the employ of the United States Quartermaster's Department. Mr. Bumford died in Italy about 1868, and Mr. Noble now lives in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

A. P. WOODWARD came first to the region east of the Cascades in 1852, and, though temporarily absent, was a resident of the Walla Walla valley in 1855, and still remains so.

W. A. TALLMAN was working for Brooke, Bumford and Noble in 1855.

WILLIAM CRAIG, an old mountaineer, had been living at Lapwai among the Nez Perces, since 1845, and the friendship of that tribe for the Americans was largely due to his influence among them. He died there in October, 1869.

JOHN OWENS, also a mountaineer, had been living in what now is Montana, since 1850; now deceased.

DR. WILLIAM MCKAY had been living on the Umatilla river since 1851, and still resides there.

There were three transient men working for H. M. Chase, and some for Brooke, Bumford and Noble.

EX-HUDSON'S BAY FRENCH EMPLOYÉS LIVING NEAR FRENCH TOWN ON THE
WALLA WALLA RIVER.

— PACQUETTE, Indian wife and two children.

— POIRER, and Indian wife.

— TELLIER, Indian wife and six children.

E. BEAUCHEMIR, Indian wife and six children.

A. LA COURSE, Indian wife and three children.

NARCISES REMOND, Indian wife and two children.

LEWIS DAUNY, Indian wife and three children.

L. ROCQUE, Indian wife and three children.

T. MORISETTE, Indian wife and three children.

— BRANCHEAU, Indian wife and four children.

OLIVER BRISBOIS, Indian wife and one child.

A. D. PAMBRUN.

WILLIAM McBEAN, Indian wife and eleven children.

J. B. IGNACE, Indian wife and one child.

MIGNAN FINDLAY, Indian wife and three children.

NICHELO FINDLAY.

— ETTEYNE, Indian wife and one child.

FATHER CHIROUSE, and two brothers.

FATHER PONDOSA, temporarily.

To the foregoing add JAMES SINCLAIR with several employès, who had charge of the Hudson's Bay fort at Wallula, and it includes the inhabitants, living within the region already hostile or liable to immediately become so.

Besides those residing in the country, there were many transient persons passing through it, or liable to do so, whose lives would be endangered if the uprising should extend east or south of the Columbia river. Included among this class, were the miners, Governor Stevens' party and the overland immigrants. Miners in the Colville country, while they remained there, were safe, as the Indians in that section desired peace. Their lands had not been disposed of to the whites, and the Catholic priests, aided by the Hudson's Bay Company, were using their influence to prevent an outbreak, a task not difficult to perform, as those tribes, as yet, had no serious grievance to complain of. The main body of those treasure seekers, as they approached the gold region, had begun to meet returning parties, who reported gold in quantities so limited that no one was warranted in remaining in the country, and many because of such reports immediately turned back. Others stopped in Colville valley for a time, and possibly two hundred reached this point before deciding to return. Because of those unfavorable reports and the Indian outbreak, not over sixty reached the mines that at least a thousand had started for. Those assembled at Colville organized into companies and made their way back to the settlements, avoiding the Yakima country on their return. Some few attempted it alone, or in small squads, and their graves have never been found. Governor Stevens was still east of the Rocky mountains, but the time had come when he was expected to return, and, as his route necessarily lay through the disaffected region, his party were liable to be cut off and massacred by the hostiles.

This was the condition of affairs existing after the troops were driven out of the Yakima country by *Kamaiakun*, and the disaffected Indians generally were encouraged to resistance because of this success. All tribes under control of that redoubtable chief had entered upon the war path; but, could hostilities be confined to his followers, the result of the war, at most, would not be calamitous. The lives of such settlers and transient whites as we have mentioned, would not be endangered.

There was another imminent danger threatening, however, in the evident sympathy of *Peu-peu-mox-mox*, with the *Kamaiakun* outbreak. At one time he had been a strong friend to the whites, but the death of his son, murdered by them in cold blood at Sutter's Fort, had changed that feeling to hate, and he only waited a favorable opportunity to wreak his vengeance upon the race that had wronged him. Should this dreaded Walla Walla once sound his war-cry, the Umatilla and Cayuse tribes would answer to the call, making a chain of hostile tribes from the Grande Ronde across the Columbia to the British possessions. Could *Peu-Peu-mox-mox* be kept from entering upon the war path for a few weeks only, it would give time, because of the lateness of the

season, for the emigrants to come in beyond danger, the straggling miners to get out of the country, and, possibly, for Governor Stevens to pass unmolested through his territory. An opportunity would thus be given for the settlers also to seek safety.

RESULT OF THE ATTEMPT TO PACIFY PEU-PEU-MOX-MOX.

Nathan Olney, the Indian agent, fully comprehending the grave position, started from the Dalles with \$500 in silver and some presents of goods to go to Wallula and pay *Peu-peu-mox-mox* the first installment due him under the treaty. He was accompanied on the journey only by *Ta-be-bo*, a half-breed, and A. P. Woodward, the latter of whom still lives on the Walla Walla river near Dry creek. On their arrival, October 12, at old Fort Walla Walla near the mouth of the river of that name, they were cordially received by James Sinclair, who with three or four men had charge of the fort. *Peu-peu-mox-mox* was sent for and told that the promised money and goods awaited him, but he returned a sullen and defiant reply. He repudiated the treaty; said he would accept neither presents nor money from the government, and wanted the whites to leave his country. Finding that nothing could be accomplished by negotiations, Mr. Olney notified the settlers of the full danger that surrounded them and advised an immediate abandonment of the country. A council between the agent and Sinclair, resulted in a determination to abandon the fort. The surplus ammunition stored there by the Hudson's Bay Company, was taken out in a boat and dumped in the Columbia river, to prevent its falling into the hands of Indians. Then the settlers, the Hudson's Bay men, and a number of miners who had reached this point, started for the Dalles, leaving the hostile country east of the Cascade mountains untenanted with whites, *except* by a few ex-Hudson's Bay Company French employes who had married into these tribes, a couple of priests, and

TWO AMERICANS.

During the first days in October, Henry M. Chase, Lloyd Brooke, and a Frenchman named P. M. Lafontain had started for the Dalles to procure winter supplies for their ranches at and near the present site of Dayton in Columbia county. They had passed the agency, on the Umatilla river, when overtaken by a horseman who informed them of the *Kamaiakun* outbreak. They returned to the agency where they found Mr. Whitney, who had just arrived from near where Pendleton now stands, on his way out of the country with his family. He also had been warned by a friendly Indian of the danger menacing the whites, and was struggling to place his wife who was in ill-health beyond the reach of a scalping-knife. Mr. Chase, seeing the woman's sad condition, turned over his team and wagon to the husband, thus enabling him to take his family from the dangerous locality. It was a valuable span of horses worth \$500, and the husband was requested to leave them with a certain party at the Dalles, but the owner has never heard from them since.

The three men then started for McKay's cabin, on the creek of that name, which empties into the Umatilla a little below the present site of Pendleton. Reaching the place, they took possession of it with a view of staying through the night, but a friendly Indian came and told the party of the intention of some hostiles to murder them before

morning, and folding their blankets they "silently stole away" by a circuitous route to Dry creek on their way to the Walla Walla valley where they passed the few remaining hours of the night. With the coming day their journey was resumed, and reaching the Whitman mission, a council was held to advise as to the best course to pursue under the circumstances. It was decided to convert into a fort, the house just erected by Brooke, Bumford and Noble, on the Touchet, about half way between where now stands Dayton and Waitsburg. H. M. Chase and Lafontain at once returned to their ranches on the Touchet and commenced preparation for a siege. Mr. Chase had three Americans working for him at the time, who, being told of the outbreak, decided to remain and help protect his property. The time agreed upon with the citizens of Walla Walla for occupying the Brooke and Bumford house had passed, but no one came, and Mr. Chase became uneasy. He sent Lafontain down to the valley in the night to find what caused the delay, and learned on the messenger's return in the morning, that the whole American population of the country were on the eve of leaving it, including the gentlemen who had proposed to stay and "fight it out on that line." They used their best endeavors by letter to get Mr. Chase to join them, and return to the Dalles with the Indian agent, Nathaniel Olney, who had advised this movement. This he refused to do, and declared that if a man could be found who would remain with him, the country should not be abandoned. He lived at this time in a substantial log house on his claim which included the present site of Dayton, in Columbia county. After telling his three men what had transpired below, he asked if they would still remain and help convert the log house into a stockaded fort. They were enthusiastic to do this, and the work of preparing logs for a stockade began.

Enthusiastic courage is an electric spark that is apt to ignite any kindred element with which it comes in contact, and these mountain adventurers were fired by the act and chivalry of the hair-brained attempt by Mr. Chase to undertake to do what the resources of two territories, aided by the United States Government, were taxing their utmost strength to accomplish; that is, to maintain American supremacy in the country.

For a day everything moved like a charm, but with the evening came reflections and a council among the rank and file of the Chase phalanx. It resulted in that gentleman being informed that, having neither land, stock, valuables, nor Indians lost in the territory, whom it would be desirable to find, they had concluded to shake the dangerous dust of that section from off their feet; and they "dusted." One of the four, however, remained; he had a land claim adjoining Mr. Chase; his name was P. M. Lafontain, and he was a Frenchman.

There was an American living on Tukannon river at a place now called Marengo, whose name was Louis Raboin. Thus Mr. Chase and Raboin became the only two Americans who remained in the hostile country after Nathan Olney and his party had left Fort Walla Walla for the Dalles in October. The other whites remaining were ex-Hudson's Bay employes, who counted upon their matrimonial connection and friendship with the Indians, rather than fortifications, for their safety. Mr. Chase and Lafontain, though not being able by themselves to put up a stockade, determined to remain at all hazards, and continued defensive preparations as they best could. Bullets were run till a pail was nearly full; holes were cut through the log walls, just far enough so that a vigorous push with a gun-barrel from the inside would make an

opening through which to fire upon an attacking party; meat was dried; potatoes were placed in the tunnel; flour was stored away in the building; a tunnel was run from the house to within a few feet of the creek, through which water could be obtained in case of siege, or to serve in the event of disaster, as a possible avenue of escape the last resort for defense. For ten days these two, standing alternate guard night and day, continued the labor of strengthening their position. Not an Indian made his appearance, but the ceaseless watching for a foe that never came, produced at last a depressing effect that finally caused them to abandon their stronghold and seek, with their stock, the protection of the Nez Perces, the long-tried friends of the Americans. On their way one night was passed at the cabin of Raboin, who joined them, and there remained no longer an American in the hostile country. They had been gone from the place but a day when the Indians came in strength to capture them, and, finding but an empty house, burned it to the ground.

CHAPTER XIX.

RESUME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

That the reader might better understand with what the young territories of Washington and Oregon had to contend, the foregoing digression was made from a narration of events following the Haller defeat. The Oregon Governor had called for ten companies, the Washington Governor had called for two more, and the regulars were concentrating; all for operation in the Columbia river country, with Maj. G. J. Raines of the 4th U. S. Infantry in command.

The two Washington Territory companies were mustered into the regular service, and Governor Curry issued an order for that purpose to the Oregon volunteers, but countermanded it. This change of policy opened the door for jealousy between the regular and volunteer forces, that later, became a serious obstacle to effective operations in the field. It was with great difficulty that the Oregon troops procured arms and ammunition from the regulars for the campaign, although Maj. Raines was more favorably disposed towards them than were his successors.

Col. J. W. Nesmith, commanding the Oregon volunteers, arrived at the Dalles on the nineteenth of October, and the time intervening until the twenty-fifth, was spent in an ineffectual attempt to obtain supplies from the regular army officers. During this time the letter, hereafter quoted, was written to Colonel Nesmith by Major Raines. Every available resource having been brought in play to equip and arm the Oregon volunteers, it was finally accomplished; and the force was enabled to move from the Dalles north into the enemy's country. The regulars, having started in advance, were overtaken by Colonel Nesmith on the third of November, 1855; after which, for the

balance of that campaign, the two divisions marched together, fought the enemy, and fraternized like allied forces opposing a common enemy. The Oregon troops, however, were an independent command subject to orders: first, from their Governor, and second, from Colonel Nesmith—their organization being as follows;

FIRST REGIMENT OREGON MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS UNDER CALL OF OCTOBER 11, 1855.

FIELD AND STAFF OFFICERS.

Rank from.	Name.
October 13—	J. W. Nesmith, Colonel. Resigned December 14, 1855.
October 30—	James K. Kelly, Lieutenant Colonel.
October 30—	A. N. Armstrong, Major. Resigned December 27.
October 30—	M. A. Chinn, Major.
October 13—	William H. Farrar, Adjutant.
October 13—	R. Thompson, Quartermaster.
October 13—	S. Norris, Commissary of Subsistence. Resigned December 1.
October 18—	J. F. Miller, Issuing Commissary.
November 7—	W. H. Fountleroy, Assistant Quartermaster.

LINE OFFICERS.

OCTOBER 13—COMPANY A ENROLLED 97 MEN.

Date of Muster.

October 15—Captain A. V. Wilson.
 October 15—First Lieutenant B. M. Harding.
 October 15—Second Lieutenant C. B. Pillow.

OCTOBER 18—COMPANY B ENROLLED 65 MEN.

October 18—Captain O. Humason.
 October 18—First Lieutenant John T. Jeffries.
 October 18—Second Lieutenant James A. McAuliff, present Mayor of Walla Walla.

OCTOBER 15—COMPANY C ENROLLED 93 MEN.

October 16—Captain James K. Kelly Elected Lieutenant Colonel October 30.
 November 4—Captain Samuel B. Stafford.
 October 16—First Lieutenant D. B. Hannah.
 October 16—Second Lieutenant James A. Pownall.
 November 4—Second Lieutenant Charles Cutting.

OCTOBER 15—COMPANY D ENROLLED 100 MEN.

October 17—Captain Thomas R. Cornelius. Elected Colonel First Regiment December 21.
 October 17—First Lieutenant Hiram Wilbur.
 October 17—Second Lieutenant W. H. H. Myers.
 December 30—Second Lieutenant John H. Smith.

OCTOBER 15—COMPANY E ENROLLED 99 MEN.

October 17—Captain A. J. Hembree.
 October 17—First Lieutenant John P. Hibbler.
 October 17—Second Lieutenant William A. Wright.

Total force officers and enlisted men.....796.

OCTOBER 15—COMPANY F ENROLLED 81 MEN.

Date of Muster.

October 19—Captain Charles Bennett. Killed in battle December 7, 1855.
 October 19—First Lieutenant A. M. Fellows. Elected Captain in December, 1855.
 October 19—Second Lieutenant A. Shephard. Elected First Lieutenant in December, 1855.
 December —Second Lieutenant Richard A. Barker

OCTOBER 15—COMPANY G ENROLLED 104 MEN.

October 19—Captain A. N. Armstrong. Elected Major October 30, 1855.
 November 2—Captain Benjamin Hayden.
 October 19—First Lieutenant Ira S. Townsend.
 October 19—Second Lieutenant F. M. P. Goff.
 November 2—Second Lieutenant David Cosper.

OCTOBER 17—COMPANY H ENROLLED 74 MEN.

October 20—Captain Davis Layton.
 October 20—First Lieutenant A. Hanan. Present residence Dayton, W. T.
 October 20—Second Lieutenant John M. Barrows. Killed in battle December 7, 1855.

OCTOBER 20—COMPANY I ENROLLED 71 MEN.

October 20—Captain Lyman B. Monson.
 October 20—First Lieutenant Smith Suard.
 October 20—Second Lieutenant Chas. B. Hand.

OCTOBER 31—COMPANY K ENROLLED 30 MEN.

October 31—Captain Narcisse A. Cornoyer.
 October 31—First Lieutenant Antoine Rivais.
 October 31—Second Lieutenant Thos. J. Small.

WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TERRITORY VOLUNTEERS.

The first regiment of Washington Territory volunteers were three months' men, and were called into the field and local service by a proclamation of acting Governor Mason, dated October 14, 1855, and included both cavalry and infantry. Two of the companies, A and B of the cavalry, were mustered into the regular army, and the remainder were not. The majority of them were organized to protect the immediate vicinity of their homes, while others were for special purposes; like the Stevens Guards, Spokane Invincibles, and Nez Perce Volunteers under Spotted Eagle.

FIRST REGIMENT WASHINGTON TERRITORY CAVALRY VOLUNTEERS.

¹ Company A—Captain William Strong; rank and file.....	61 men
¹ Company B—Captain Gilmore Hays; rank and file.....	91 men
² Company E—Captain I. Hays; rank and file.....	40 men
² Company F—Captain B. F. Henness; rank and file.....	63 men
³ Company K—Captain J. R. Jackson; rank and file.....	26 men
² Cowlitz Rangers—Captain Henry Peers; rank and file.....	39 men
² Lewis River Rangers—Captain William Bratton; rank and file.....	44 men
³ Stevens Guard—Captain C. P. Higgins; rank and file.....	25 men
⁴ Spokane Invincibles—Captain B. F. Yantiss; rank and file.....	23 men
² Puget Sound Rangers—Captain Charles Eaton; rank and file.....	36 men
⁵ Nez Perce Volunteers—Chief Spotted Eagle; rank and file.....	70 men
Total rank and file.....	518 men

FIRST REGIMENT WASHINGTON TERRITORY INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS.

Company C—Captain George B. Goudy; rank and file.....	70 men
⁶ Company D—Captain W. H. Wallace; rank and file.....	55 men
Company G—Captain W. A. S. McCorkle; rank and file.....	22 men
Company H—Captain C. C. Hewitt; rank and file.....	75 men
Company I—Captain I. N. Ebey; rank and file.....	84 men
Company J—Captain A. A. Plummer; rank and file.....	29 men
Nesqually Ferry Guards—Sergeant Packwood; rank and file.....	10 men
Total rank and file.....	345 men

We have been unable to learn what constituted the regular army forces operating in this department at the time. Colonel Nesmith took with him on the Yakima expedition, companies C, D, E, F and G, the remainder being left at the Dalles under Lieutenant-Colonel James K. Kelly to protect the base of supplies. With the regular force under Major Raines was the since world-renowned Phil Sheridan, at that time a lieutenant of dragoons. This move to the north was intended as a co-operative advance into the enemy's country, another column having started to meet them from the Sound under Captain M. Maloney of the Fourth Infantry. The intention was to

¹ Mustered into the regular service and furnished their own horses.

² Furnished their own horses.

³ Horses furnished by Government.

⁴ Horses partly furnished by Government and partly by volunteers.

⁵ Furnished their own horses and equipments.

⁶ A portion of Company D served as mounted men and furnished their own horses.

strike the Indians from the north and south at the same time, and, by bringing them between two advancing columns, either whip or awe them into subjection, and thus prevent a farther spread among adjoining tribes of the hope on their part of a successful war.

CAPTAIN M. MALONEY'S OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

It will be remembered that, at the first indication of hostilities, Lieutenant W. A. Slaughter had been ordered from Fort Steilacoom on the twenty-seventh of September into the Yakima country from the north by way of Nachess pass, with forty men and forty days rations, and Major Haller had started from the south to form a junction with him in the enemy's country. When Haller was defeated before he had joined Slaughter, the latter was forced, without knowing of the defeat, to fall back from the pass into the White river prairie where Captain M. Maloney joined him with seventy-five men on the twenty-first of October. On the the twenty-fourth Captain Hays with his company of Washington volunteers reached Captain Maloney who immediately took up his line of march with this force to co-operate with the troops supposed to be moving north from the Dalles. On the twenty-ninth of October Captain Maloney addressed Major Raines as follows :

"I commenced my march for the Yakima country, expecting to find you in the field. Yesterday I arrived at this camp, when I laid over to-day to recruit my animals. I received an express to-day from Steilacoom from which I get information that you will *not be on your march for from one to two weeks*. I have also got information that there are from two to three thousand Indians, well armed and determined to fight, in my front, and, after considering the matter over, have concluded that it is my duty to return to Steilacoom. My reasons are as follows, viz: my force is not sufficiently strong to fight them and protect the animals and provisions which I have along with me; secondly, if I advance I must meet them, as there is no point before me before I get into the plains, where I can camp and defend myself and animals; where I will not be cut off from communication, both in front and rear by high water, before you can get into the enemy's country; thirdly, in accordance with your orders I started with thirty days' provisions. I have been out twelve days, and therefore have only eighteen days' provisions which would be out before my command could join yours. There is already snow upon the mountains, and there is every reason to believe that in three or four days it will close the road from here to Steilacoom, and, also, raise the Nachess river so that it will prevent communication between this place and the Yakima plains.

"I am of the opinion that the best way to get the troops from Steilacoom into the enemy's will be by way of the Dalles.

"I also learn from the same express that the northern Indians are showing themselves in considerable numbers at Steilacoom and other points on the Sound, intending, with other Indians, to strike a blow in case I should be defeated here."

From this communication it will be seen that before the force under Raines and Nesmith left the Dalles, Captain Maloney had fallen back.

His retrograde movement encouraged the Indians who attacked him on White river, and the official report of the engagement notes one regular killed, one volunteer wounded and forty Indians sent to the happy hunting grounds; but Maloney continued to fall back till he reached Fort Steilacoom. This was the third force that, starting with the purpose, had failed to punish *Kamaiakun*. This movement by Captain Maloney left the southern column with its own resources to depend upon only, which fact remained unknown to them for a long time, because of their having no direct communication with the Sound.

THE REGULARS AND OREGON TROOPS IN THE YAKIMA COUNTRY.

It has been already noted that Colonel Nesmith's command had overtaken the regulars under Major Raines on the third of November, and that the united force was moving to the north. On the seventh Governor Curry sent companies A and K to reinforce Colonel Nesmith, which would swell his force to 553 men, rank and file. This reinforcement lost its way, and failed to reach the Colonel until on his way back to the Dalles. At the same time instructions were forwarded for the Colonel to return by way of Walla Walla at the close of the Yakima campaign, to which place along the south side of the Columbia river, a force of 150 men were to be sent him. This order was not obeyed.

On the way through the country a large quantity of secreted Indian provisions, estimated at 10,000 pounds, was discovered, and either taken possession of or destroyed, and, in turn, the Indians captured some ten of the soldiers' pack animals. But few of the enemy were seen on the march all of whom kept at a safe distance. On the morning of the eighth the entire force was camped at the southern edge of the Yakima valley on Simcoe creek, and when the line of march that day was taken up, Captain Cornelius with 70 men made a detour to the left on a scout to see if the enemy were to be found in that direction. Towards evening the main body reached the vicinity of the Yakima river and camped, with the regulars some two miles in advance. Major Raines, commanding the latter, soon discovered the enemy in some bushes on the opposite bank of the stream and opened upon them, at the same time dispatching a courier back to Colonel Nesmith advising him of the enemy's presence. The Colonel on receipt of the news dashed away to the front at the head of 60 men, where he found the regulars and Indians passing leaden compliments with the river flowing between them. He at once commenced searching for a ford, found it, crossed the stream, and dislodging the savages, followed them ineffectually until they took refuge in the direction of the "Buttes" to the northeast, from where he withdrew and went into camp after dark. Lieutenant Phil. Sheridan, at the head of some twenty United States dragoons followed the force under Colonel Nesmith across the river, and gallantly joined the successful advance.

That evening Captain Cornelius reached Nesmith's camp, having been engaged during the greater part of the afternoon with a large body of Indians, in which three of his men and several horses had received wounds.

On the morning of November 9, the entire force moved in the direction of a gap in the hills through which flows the Yakima river, at a point known as the "Two Buttes." The advance guard consisted of companies commanded by Captains Cornelius, Hembree and Bennett. These drove the Indians from their lurking places in the bushes along the river until all—some 300—had fallen back and taken possession of their rude fortifications upon the "Buttes." At first a howitzer was tried, but, for want of sufficient elevation, its shell failed to reach the enemy. Then Major Haller and Captain Augur with their commands, aided by a force of volunteers, charged up the rugged, broken face of the mountain, from which the Indians fled down the opposite side in hot haste. The savages had made no resistance during the day after finding

that the soldiers were determined to force an engagement at close range if possible; consequently no one was hurt.

That night the whites camped at the base of the Buttes, and the Indians re-occupied the abandoned heights, but in the morning they were again dislodged with a loss of two killed. The capture of their entire force at this time only failed through the misconception of orders by Lieutenant D. B. Hannah. The Indians made no further resistance and at once abandoned that section of country. That day a few straggling, retreating bands were met in the valley, where skirmishes took place; and at night the troops bivouacked by the Athanam river, some two miles east of the Catholic mission.

Up to this time no communication had been received, by the forces under Colonel Nesmith or Major Raines, from Captain Maloney, who, as they supposed, was making his way through the Nachess pass to join them, and fears were entertained that the entire force of Indians might have gone in that direction for the purpose of overwhelming him by numbers. He was back at the Sound safely housed in Fort Steilacoom, but this fact was not yet known to them.

Colonel Nesmith with 250 men, among whom were Phil. Sheridan and his dragoons, started on the morning of November 11 for this pass, with a view of rendering assistance to Captain Maloney if he needed it, or at least to open communication with him. A violent snow storm setting in, he was forced to return; and, after an absence of three days, his tents were pitched at the old Catholic mission, where the main force under Major Raines had preceded him. While stationed there the troops *accidentally* burned the mission building, that had been constructed of poles and mud. On the fifteenth a council of war was held, and the unanimous opinion prevailed that the reduced commissary supplies warranted only an immediate return to the Dalles, and a line of march in that direction was at once taken up.

On the seventeenth, while crossing the Simcoe mountains, Colonel Nesmith received the Governor's order to return by way of Fort Walla Walla; but it was found impossible to obey it; and the whole command reached the Klikitat river, twenty-four miles north from the Columbia where horses could be grazed, and Colonel Nesmith the Dalles, on the nineteenth of November.

CHAPTER XX.

WINTER CAMPAIGN OF OREGON TROOPS IN THE WALLA WALLA COUNTRY.

November 12—the same day on which the force under Colonel Nesmith was pushing forward to meet Captain Maloney in the Nachess pass, from where he was forced back by the fierce, continued storm of snow—Major Mark A. Chinn, with company B, moved from the Dalles along the south side of the Columbia river in the direction of Fort Walla Walla, in accordance with the Governor's plan of a general concentration at that point. Company K had preceded the Major, and was camped three miles above the De Chutes river, on the banks of the Columbia. Here the two companies were united, and the Major pushed forward, reaching Well Springs on the seventeenth. Not a sign of an Indian had been seen along the line of march, and constant scouting on the way had failed to discover any. Their absence had become a subject of alarm to the commanding officer, as indicating a general uprising and concentration of the tribes. Added to this was the failure, up to this time, of Narcises Remond, who had been sent among the enemy by the Indian agent, to report what he had learned regarding them. In the night, after Major Chinn's arrival at the Well Springs, John McBean and a companion came into camp as couriers from Mr. Remond. Their report was that *Peu-peu-mox-mox* had sent a large force of his warriors to watch the movements of the volunteers; and that Fort Walla Walla was already in possession of the Indians, about 1,000 of whom were occupying it and the adjacent advantageous positions. This information determined Major Chinn to abandon the present attempt at reaching that point until reinforcements could be obtained from the Dalles, for which he dispatched a courier. In the meantime he determined to move forward to the Umatilla river and fortify, making the old Catholic agency grounds the base of supplies and operations against the hostiles. On the eighteenth he reached the proposed "new base," where works were constructed, which he describes as follows: "We have an abundance of timber and water, and tolerable grass for stock. We have now picketed in with large split timber 100 feet square of ground, and erected two bastions of round logs on two of the angles; and from the rails found here, made two corrals for the horses and cattle. This, as a defense, is good against any body of Indians."

From this point the Major sent, on the twenty-first of November, another courier to the Dalles, asking for two more companies and artillery to assist him in moving upon Fort Walla Walla. It will be remembered that the forces from the Yakima country, which were to co-operate with Major Chinn, had returned instead to the Dalles, having reached that vicinity on the nineteenth; but he was not aware of this fact. On the twenty-first, Captain Munson's company of 71 men, and three days

later, Captains Wilson and Cornoyer's companies, consisting of about 100 men, marched to reinforce Major Chinn, accompanied by Lieut. Col. James K. Kelly, who was to take command of the forces at the front.

REGULARS REFUSE TO JOIN THE VOLUNTEERS IN A WINTER CAMPAIGN.

A difference of opinion in regard to the control of operations the field had arisen between the regulars and volunteers, as before stated, at the threshold of active operations. The former wished to take charge of military operations, while the latter insisted upon a separate organization and independent action, but were desirous of cordial and harmonious co-operation in prosecuting the war. The Territories of Oregon and Washington were neither of them prepared for either arming or equipping a force, and they sought to supply the deficiency through the regular army officers, who were asked to issue the surplus of government stores in their charge to the volunteers. The request was not complied with, on the ground that there was no existing authority which warranted the commanding officer of the department in issuing government property to citizens: but the applicants were informed that muster into the regular army removed such disability. This, the forces under Colonel Nesmith had refused to do; but, after some vexatious delay, they were poorly fitted for the field through various devices, including the receipt of a few arms with ammunition, etc., issued to them by the United States officers, under the law which entitled Oregon to certain military equipments she had not received.

A considerable feeling had developed during this controversy between the two branches of the force preparing to take the field; during the progress of which, Major Raines, on the eve of moving from the Dalles into the Yakima country, had addressed a letter to Colonel Nesmith, in which occurred the following language:

"If you and your command will be enrolled and mustered into the service of the United States—yourself as Major—* * * and each company with its own elected officers * * * and musicians, we can take the field immediately with some show of success. But, should you determine otherwise, and wait for the slow and uncertain movements of those in the rear, which, as things proceed, will not be in condition to march before it will be winter, indeed, and too late. I shall march on with the regulars, and leave you and the citizens in arms with you to reconcile to themselves and their honorable feelings any mishaps which may befall us in fulfilling our duty to our country."

The proposition, as the Major had put it, looked like an unenviable one, as it was important that a move should be made at once. The refusal of the volunteers to be mustered was placed by him upon the score of a lack of patriotism and disregard for any calamity that might befall the command of Major Raines, for want of assistance when the enemy was met. The condition in which Major Chinn found himself on the Umatilla, reversed the former apparent position of affairs. Now it was the volunteers who were really in peril; whereupon, Colonel Nesmith addressed Major Raines the following Nesmithean epistle, which proved that, even in those days, his pen could cut like a sword. Since the opening of the Yakima campaign, General Wool had arrived at Vancouver and assumed command of the department.

HEADQUARTERS REGIMENT, O. V.,

DALLES, O. T.; November 25, 1855. }

MAJOR RAINES, UNITED STATES ARMY, FOURTH INFANTRY,

AND BRIGADIER GENERAL WASHINGTON TERRITORY MILITIA:

"GENERAL:—On my arrival here the evening of the eighteenth instant, I received an express from the Second Major of my regiment, who was then advancing towards the Walla Walla country with a volunteer force of about one hundred and fifty men.

"The express brought me intelligence that the command of the Major was threatened by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and I was requested to reinforce him with 150 men and *two howitzers*. I have sent forward the number of men asked for, and, in your absence from Fort Dalles, I forwarded to Major General Wool a request to be furnished with the artillery and a requisite number of officers, and men to work the same properly.

"The delay incident to communication between this place and Vancouver, renders it quite uncertain as to the time I may receive the reply of the General. In view of this, I made, this morning the verbal application to you, as the commanding officer of this military district, to furnish me with the howitzers, hoping that under the present emergency you would feel yourself warranted in promptly responding to my call. * * * If the howitzers, with the officers and men to manage them are furnished, I can readily provide a mounted escort to take them before the position occupied by the enemy, and *'can take the field immediately with some show of success. But, should you determine otherwise, and wait for the slow and uncertain movement of those in the rear which, as things proceed, will not be in condition to march before it will be winter, indeed, and too late.*

* * *

I shall march on with the volunteers, and leave you to reconcile to your honorable feelings any mishap which may befall us in fulfilling our duty to our country.'"

This return to the Major of his own literary production, under circumstances so thoroughly applicable, completely turned the tables, and his refusal to furnish the desired howitzers, made its application of a character still more marked. Major Raines failed to comply with the request for the howitzers and artillery and men to man them, on the grounds that General Wool, being in command, was the one to grant or refuse them. General Wool refused. He would not even join in a winter campaign against the Indians; and withdrawing his forces from the field, including the three months' Washington volunteers, left the Oregon troops to meet the enemy east of the Cascades unaided.

The condition of those thus forced to continue the war unaided, will be appreciated best by reference to the following from Colonel Nesmith, under date of November 22, 1855:

"Many of the men were frost-bitten on the late expedition, and can hardly be said to be fit for duty. An inspection of horses has been had at camp, and about one-fourth of the whole number were found fitted for present duty. About one-half of the men composing the whole command desire their discharge. I have given a few discharges upon the written report of the surgeon, stating that the men were unfit for duty. I have also, granted furloughs to a few of the men who have urgent business requiring their personal attention for short periods; and am now anxiously awaiting orders for the disposition of the remainder of the command. * * * The right column, which was under my immediate command, suffered intensely during the campaign for want of tents to protect them from the inclemency of the weather. My requisition for tents is still unfilled. There is much justifiable complaint on the part of the men, by reason of their exposed condition."

November 28, Colonel Nesmith addressed Colonel Kelly at the front as follows: "The command of Captains Bennett and Cornelius will increase your command to about *four hundred and seventy-five* men, which I consider an ample force to meet the enemy in your quarter." On the same day of writing this letter, Colonel Nesmith

started for the Willamette valley, leaving Captain W. H. Farrar in command at the Dalles, Major Armstrong of the two companies in the vicinity of the De Chutes and John Day rivers, and Colonel Kelly at the front. He intended but a temporary absence, but resigned after reaching Portland, and did not return to his command.

PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF WALLA WALLA.

Lieut. Col. James K. Kelly, who had left the Dalles on the twenty-fourth of October for the purpose of taking command of active operations in the field, reached Fort Henrietta on the twenty-ninth. He learned upon arrival, that the Indians were in possession of Fort Walla Walla; that they occupied that vicinity in force; and he determined to march against them at once. His command moved with this purpose on the evening of December 2, a lieutenant and 25 men being left to hold Fort Henrietta. It was hoped that the enemy might be surprised at daybreak the next morning, but incidental delays of the night march, prevented their reaching the locality until late in the following forenoon. The fort was found pillaged, defaced, deserted, and with its furniture destroyed. The forces remained there until the fifth, when Major Chinn was sent with the baggage and 150 men to the mouth of the Touchet river, where he was to await movements of the main body. Colonel Kelly, with about 200 men, started at the same time encumbered with neither baggage nor *rations*, to find the enemy up that stream; and, as expressed in his report, "with a view of attacking the Walla Walla Indians, who were supposed to be encamped there."

With these two hundred men, Louis McMorris, now a resident of Walla Walla, went in charge of the hospital stores, and later witnessed the killing of *Peu-peu-mox-mox*. From him; the official report of Colonel Kelly; conversations with Captain Cornoyer, now living in Umatilla county, Oregon; and Lieut. James McAuliff, present Mayor of Walla Walla city, have been mainly obtained the details of what followed in the next four days. The troops followed a trail leading up the Touchet river, having scouts on the flanks and in advance, looking for prowling bands of Indians. Captain Cornoyer, with two or three men, was a long way in advance, when, reaching a point on the river where the hills on either side of a deep valley shut out the surrounding view, he determined to ascend one of them and take observations. In doing so, as he approached the summit, there suddenly appeared several Indians in his immediate front, advancing from the opposite side of the crest. In an instant the Captain's gun was leveled upon the one in advance, but, before he could fire, a flag of truce was discovered in the hand of the savage; and the Captain's companions cried out, "Don't shoot! don't shoot! it's *Peu-peu-mox-mox*!" A parley followed; but, while it was going on the Captain discovered a band of about 150 Indians on horseback, following in the direction from which the chief had come. In a twinkling his gun again covered *Peu-peu-mox-mox*, who was told that if his followers advanced nearer, his own life would pay the forfeit; and, at a signal accompanied by a peculiar cry, the advancing party halted as if by magic, every one of whom dismounted and stood by his horse.

The Chief asked if Nathan Olney, the Indian agent, was with the soldiers; and on being told that he was, expressed a desire to see him. He stated that he wanted

no fighting; that he had determined at first to make war on the whites, but, after reflection, had concluded that it was not policy for his people to do so; that he was willing to make all amends that lay in his power for what his tribe had done; and was anxious to secure a permanent peace. The Captain sent one of his men back to report what was transpiring in front, asking Colonel Kelly to come with Nathan Olney, and meet the flag of truce party. Accordingly, the volunteers were halted in plain sight of the little squad on the hill, while the parties indicated, with John McBean for interpreter, went forward to meet the redoubtable Chief.

Considerable time was consumed in the conference that followed; and, as it passed, gradually the main body of both Indians and volunteers approached the central group until all were together, the soldiers surrounding the flag party with the main force of Indians on the outside. This was done without orders, each side seemingly distrustful of the other's proximity, having approached the parliments until they were surrounded. Finally, the entire body moved on towards the Indian village, until it was discovered that the trail they were following passed through a dangerous cañon, when another halt was made. A portion of the troops had already entered the cañon, among whom was Captain Cornoyer, who, on turning back to learn what caused the delay, found that fears were entertained by some of the officers that treachery was intended by *Peu-peu-mox-mox*. Their only reason for thinking so was that the *opportunity* for treachery was favorable, therefore contemplated. Captains Cornoyer, Bennett, and others were of a different opinion; they said treachery on his part would cost him his life, and he knew it. "Put him in my charge," said Captain Cornoyer, "he will then know that the first gun fired upon our ranks will be the signal of his own death, and there will be no danger. Let us go to their village to-night and the peace he promises will be a certainty, for we will have them all in our power."

This advice was not taken. Colonel Kelly and Nathan Olney insisted that if his professions were in good faith, they could be carried out the next day just as well as to run the risk of a dangerous pass that evening; and it was determined to move back on the trail a short distance, and camp supperless for the night. The flag of truce Indians were taken with them, under close guard, as disarmed prisoners. Regarding this transaction, Colonel Kelly writes that *Peu-peu-mox-mox*

"Stated that he did not wish to fight, and that on the following day he would come and have a talk, and make a treaty of peace. On consultation with Hon. Nathan Olney, Indian agent, we concluded that this was simply a ruse to gain time for removing his village and preparing for battle. I stated to him that we had come to chastise him for the wrongs he had done to our people, and that we would not defer making an attack on his people unless he and his five followers would consent to accompany and remain with us until all difficulties were settled. I told him that he might go away under his flag of truce if he chose, but that if he did so, we would forthwith attack his village. The alternative was distinctly made known to him, and to save his people, he chose to remain with us a hostage for the fulfillment of his promises, as did also those who accompanied him. He at the same time said that on the following day he would accompany us to his village; that he would then assemble his people and make them deliver up all their arms and ammunition, restore the property which had been taken from the white settlers, or pay the full value of that which could not be restored, and that he would furnish fresh horses to remount my command and cattle to supply them with provisions to enable us to wage war against other hostile tribes who were leagued with him. Having made these promises, we refrained from making the attack, thinking we had him in our power, that on the next day his promises would be fulfilled. I also permitted him to send one of the men who accompanied

him to his village to apprise the tribes of the terms of the expected treaty, so that they might be prepared to fulfill it.

"I have since learned from a Nez Perce boy who *was taken at the same time with Peu-peu-mox-mox*, that instead of sending word to his people to make a treaty of peace, he sent an order for them to remove their women and children and prepare for battle. From all I have since learned, I am well persuaded that he was acting with duplicity, and that he expected to entrap my command in the deep ravine in which his camp was situated, and make his escape from us."

All of the facts in regard to the capture of this chief, taking of this chief, or his surrender as a hostage to save his people, by whichever of the three ways, he came to be a prisoner, evidently are not given in this report; but according to it, Colonel Kelly proposed to go and attack his village, and to prevent this *Peu-peu-mox-mox* was willing to return with them as a hostage. How did Colonel Kelly propose to get at their village, by the dangerous cañon, or some other way? If there was another route not dangerous, why did he not take it and go on? If the chief had contemplated ambushing them in the cañon, his reply to Colonel Kelly would naturally have been, I will not go back with you as a hostage, hoping that his refusal would cause them to enter his trap. His willingness to return *when left to do so or not*, as he chose, is strong evidence that he would have nothing to gain by their passage through the cañon, for, as far as he knew, he could have caused them to do so by refusing to remain with them as a hostage.

Captain Cornoyer said to the writer: "I was thoroughly convinced then, and remain so still, that *Peu-peu-mox-mox* came with that flag of truce in good faith, and believe that if we had gone ahead that night, the war would have ended then and there." "But," says Colonel Kelly, "I have since learned from a Nez Perce boy who was taken at the same time with *Peu-peu-mox-mox*, that instead of sending word to his people to make a treaty of peace he sent an order to them to *remove their women and children and prepare for battle*." This was after he surrendered as a hostage, and is evidence almost conclusive that *prior to this* they were *not prepared*. Why send word for them to "prepare for battle," if they had already done so. A failure upon the part of this great warrior and chief to get ready for hostilities, is evidence that he did not anticipate a necessity of such preparation, which could only be avoided by treating for peace.

Let us proceed with events as they developed. That night the camp and its vicinity was a scene of stormy councils and of stormy elements. The volunteers were tired, hungry and dissatisfied, while the inhospitable elements shedding their fleecy carpet of snow upon the ground for the soldiers to lie upon, made them angry and almost mutinous, in their belief that it was the prisoner's fault that had placed them in their disagreeable position. "Shoot the damned Indians!" was a cry frequently heard from different parts of the camp, and the captives became restless and ill at ease, believing that their lives were in danger. The chief requested to be turned loose, and some of the officers were in favor of permitting him to go, while others were not. Finally an Indian appeared on an adjacent hill who desired to talk with the chief, but would not come in; and Captain Cornoyer went out to talk with him accompanied by several, among whom was John McBean, the interpreter. The interview was unsatisfactory, as the Indian seemed only desirous of being heard by the captive chief, and talked in a very loud voice. What he said was not made clear to the Captain and

his associates, and, concluding that all was not right, they took the loud-voiced messenger back with them a prisoner into camp. This Indian was one of those who was afterwards slain while a prisoner. At different times in the night Indians came around upon the hills and shouted communications to the chief, who told his captors that his people were becoming frightened for their own safety and his. Morning revealed the fact that the camp had been surrounded during the night by a cordon of mounted Indians, who evidently had listened to the threats, dissensions, and unfriendly talk in the volunteer camp, which was enough in itself in combination with the fact that their chief was a prisoner, to make them fear treachery on the part of the whites.

The humiliating terms to which *Peu-peu-mox-mox* agreed, for the fulfillment of which he gave himself up as a *willing* hostage, were evidently only considered after traveling to the mouth of that cañon with an army that was marching with the avowed purpose of destroying his village; for prior to this he was not a prisoner, was free to go, and had retained his arms. Taking it for granted that a plot had been laid to attack the whites while making this dangerous passage, let us see what the logical results would be. The leader of the conspiracy, just as his scheme is on the eve of fulfillment, learns that to get what he *did not want*—peace—the most humiliating terms must be complied with. He is then told, that if he will not accept those terms, his enemies will do just what he has been *scheming to get them to do* (move on towards his village), and he is at liberty to go and take command of his warriors, to make sure that no failure should occur in carrying his plans to success. Just at this point, when everything is working into his hand, he says, "I will go back with you as a hostage and thus defeat my own purpose." Is not this the act of a lunatic? And yet, it is what he is reported as having done.

All existing evidence goes to prove that this great Walla Walla leader came to sue for peace in good faith; that his advances were received with mistrust; that he was taken prisoner while under a flag of truce, to make sure that he would do what he affirmed a willingness to do; and that the actions and talk in camp that night made both him and his followers fear treachery from the whites, which caused the Indians to change their plans. The failure to go on to the Indian village in the first instance, was probably a serious mistake and a misfortune, which, at best, will throw the appearance of responsibility for what followed upon that commanding officer and his advisers. But, though this is the case, it should be borne in mind that he and they were acting with a view of accomplishing a result without endangering the lives of the volunteers *unnecessarily*; and if it was an error of judgment it was in the line of caution, and such an error as all, except an Indian, should excuse. Still it does not follow because caution required Colonel Kelly to pursue this course, that justice to him, demands that the acts and motives of his opponent should be falsely stated. An Indian is entitled to have the truth told of him, and if doing so places a white man in the wrong, it does not cease to be just because of this fact.

It is probable that a change of policy was determined upon that night by the savages which fact was evidently conveyed to *Peu-peu-mox-mox* by those who shouted messages to him from the surrounding hills in the Cayuse tongue, it being a language unknown to the interpreter and is no longer spoken by any tribe. The next morning the captive was anxious for delay, stating that his people needed time to prepare provisions and cook

close to which stood the cabin; and the flat was covered with sage brush and sand knolls behind which a foe could lurk unseen, while the hills were lined with mounted hostiles. The description of what followed is from the report of Colonel Kelly:

"When the volunteers reached this point there were not more than 40 or 50 men, being those mounted upon the fleetest horses. Upon these the Indians poured a murderous fire from the brush-wood and willows along the river, and from the sage bushes along the plain, wounding a number of the volunteers. The men fell back. The moment was critical. They were commanded to cross the fence which surrounds La Rocque's field and charge upon the Indians in the brush. In executing this order Lieutenant Burrows of Company H was killed, and Captain Munson of Company I, Isaac Miller, Sergeant Major and G. W. Smith of Company B, were wounded. A dispatch having been sent to Captain Wilson of Company A, to come forward he and his company came up on a gallop, dismounted at a slough, and with fixed bayonets pushed on through the bush. In the course of half an hour Captain Bennett was on the ground with Company F, and with this accession the enemy were steadily driven forward for two miles, when they took possession of a farm house and close fence, in attempting to carry which Captain Bennett of Company F and Privat Kelso of Company A were killed."

This second stand was made at the cabin of a Frenchman named Tellier, whose descendants still occupy the ranch; and it is west about one mile from the Whitman mission property.

"A howitzer found at Fort Walla Walla, under charge of Captain Wilson, by this time was brought to bear upon the enemy. Four rounds were fired when the piece bursted, wounding Captain Wilson. The Indians then gave way at all points; the house and fence were seized and held by the volunteers and the bodies of our men were recovered. These positions were held by us until nightfall, when the volunteers fell slowly back and returned unmolested, to camp around the cabin of La Rocque during the night."

An important event transpired that day which it would be more proper to designate as a disgraceful tragedy enacted, that is omitted from this official report. The following is an account of it, as given to the writer by Lewis McMorris,¹ who was present at the time and saw what he narrated. The hospital supplies were packed on mules in charge of McMorris, and had just reached the La Rocque cabin where the first engagement had taken place. The surgeon in charge had decided to use it as a hospital in which to place those wounded in the battle, and McMorris was unpacking the mules. Near it the unfortunate Lieutenant J. M. Burrows lay dead, and several wounded were being attended to. The combatants had passed on up the valley, and the distant detonation of their guns could be heard. The flag of truce prisoners were there under guard, and everyone seemed electrified with suppressed excitement. A wounded man came in with his shattered arm dangling at his side, and reported Captain Bennett killed at the front. This added to the excitement, and the attention of all was more or less attracted to the wounded man, when some one said, "Look out, or the Indians will get away!" At this, seemingly, every one yelled, "Shoot 'em! Shoot 'em!" and on the instant there was a rattle of musketry on all sides.²

¹ G. W. Miller of Company H, now residing near Dayton, and William Nixon of Company I now living seven miles from that place, were both present when the prisoners were killed, the latter having one of them in charge at the time, and both confirm the statements of McMorris.

² From the statements of the various parties interviewed who witnessed this event, the writer is impressed with a belief that Colonel Kelly said, in regard to the prisoners, as he rode from the cabin to the front, "Tie them or kill them, I don't care a damn which;" and that the refusal of the big Indian and the Chief to be tied, furnished the opportunity for killing them their captors were anxiously wishing for.

What followed was so quick, and there were so many acting, that McMorris could not see it in detail, though all was transpiring within a few yards of, and around him. It was over in a minute, and three of the five prisoners were dead; another was wounded, knocked senseless and supposed to be dead, who afterwards recovered consciousness, and was shot to put him out of misery, while the fifth was spared because he was a Nez Perce. McMorris remembers some of the events that marked the tragedy, however, such as an impression on his mind of an attempt by the prisoners to escape, that started the shooting;¹ that everybody was firing, because they were excited and the target was an Indian; that he saw no evidence of an attempt to escape, except from being murdered; that they were killed while surrounded by, and mingled among, the whites; and that but one Indian offered to defend his life. The prisoner offering resistance was a powerful Willamette Indian called "Jim," or Wolf Skin, who, having a knife secreted upon his person, drew it and fought desperately. "I could hear that knife whistle in the air," said McMorris, "as he brandished it, or struck at the soldier with whom he was struggling." It lasted but a moment, when another soldier, approaching from behind, dealt him a blow on the head with a gun that broke in his skull and stretched him apparently lifeless upon the ground.² All were scalped in a few minutes, and later the body of *Yellow Bird*, the great Walla Walla Chief, was mutilated in a way that should entitle those who did it to a prominent niche in the ghoulis temple erected to commemorate the infamous acts of soulless men. Let us draw a screen upon this affair that has cast a shadow over the otherwise bright record of Oregon volunteers in that war, remembering, when we do so, that but few of them were responsible for its occurrence.

With the coming day the struggle was renewed, of which Colonel Kelly gives the following account:

"Early on the morning of the eighth the Indians appeared with increased forces, amounting to fully six hundred warriors. They were posted as usual in the thick brush by the river—among the sage bushes and sand knolls, and on the surrounding hills. This day Lieutenant Pillow with Company A, and Lieutenant Hannon with Company H, were ordered to take and hold the brush skirting the river and the sage bushes on the plain. Lieutenant Fellows with Company F was directed to take and keep the possession of the point at the foot of the hill. Lieutenant Jeffries with Company B, Lieutenant Hand with Company I, and Captain Cornoyer with Company K, were posted on three several points on the hills with orders to maintain them and to assail the enemy on other points of the same hills. As usual the Indians were driven from their position, although they fought with skill and bravery.

"On the ninth they did not make their appearance until about ten o'clock in the morning, and then in somewhat diminished numbers. As I had sent to Fort Henrietta for companies D and E, and expected them on the tenth, I thought it best to act on the defensive and hold our positions which were the same as on the eighth, until we could get an accession to our forces sufficient to enable us to assail their rear and cut off their retreat. An attack was made during the day on Companies A and H in the brushwood, and upon B on the hill, both of which were repulsed with great gallantry by those companies, and with considerable loss to the enemy. Companies F, I and K also did great honor to themselves in repelling all approaches to their positions, although in doing so one man in Company F and one in Company I were severely wounded. Darkness as usual closed the combat, by the enemy withdrawing from the field. Owing to the inclemency of the night the companies on the hill were withdrawn from their several positions, Company B abandon-

¹ The question is a disputed one as to whether it was the Chief or the big Indian who drew a knife and fought so desperately. All of those interviewed, who saw the transaction, except one, affirm positively that they know that it was not the Chief.

² The other gentlemen interviewed, who witnessed the affair, state that it was a refusal on the part of *Peu-peu-mox-mox* to be tied that started the struggle, which was instantly followed by the massacre.

ing its rifle pits which were made by the men of that company for its protection. At early dawn on the next day the Indians were observed from our camp to be in possession of all points held by us on the preceding day. Upon seeing them Lieutenant McAuliff of Company B gallantly observed that his company had dug those holes and after breakfast they would have them again, and well was his declaration fulfilled, for in less than half an hour, the enemy was driven from the pits and fled to an adjoining hill which they had occupied the day before. This position was at once assailed. Captain Cornoyer with Company K, and a portion of Company I, being mounted, gallantly charged the enemy on his right flank, while Lieutenant McAuliff with Company B dismounted, rushed up the hill in face of a heavy fire and scattered them in all directions. They at once fled in all directions to return to this battlefield no more, and thus ended our long-contested fight.

"In making my report I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of the officers of the several companies and most of the soldiers under their command. They did their duty bravely and well during those four trying days of battle. To Second Major Chinn, who took charge of the companies in the bush by the river, credit is due for bravery and skill; also, to Assistant Adjutant Monroe Atkinson for his efficiency and zeal as well in the field as in the camp. And here while giving to the officers and men of the regiment the praise that is justly due, I cannot omit the name of Hon Nathan Olney, although he is not one of the volunteers. Having accompanied me in the capacity of Indian agent, I requested him to act as my aid, on account of his admitted skill in Indian warfare; and to his wisdom in council and daring courage on the field of battle, I am much indebted, and shall ever appreciate his worth.

"Companies D and E having arrived from Fort Henrietta on the evening of the tenth, the next morning I followed with all the available troops along the Nez Perce's trail in pursuit of the Indians. On Mill creek, about twelve miles from here, we passed through their village numbering one hundred and ninety-six fires, which had been deserted the night before. Much of their provisions was scattered by the wayside, indicating that they had fled in great haste to the north. We pursued them until it was too dark to follow the track of their horses, when we camped on Coppee creek. On the twelfth we continued the pursuit until we passed some distance beyond the station of Brooke, Noble and Bumford on the Touchet, when we found the chase was in vain, as many of our horses were completely broken down and the men on foot. We therefore returned and arrived in camp on yesterday evening with about one hundred head of cattle which the Indians left scattered along the trail in their flight.

"On the eleventh, while in pursuit of the enemy, I received a letter from Narcisse Raymond by the hands of *Tin-tin-metzy*, a friendly chief (which I enclose), asking our protection of the French and friendly Indians under his charge.

"On the morning of the twelfth, I dispatched Captain Cornoyer with his command to their relief. Mr. Olney, who accompanied them, returned to camp this evening, and reports that Captain Cornoyer will return to-morrow with Mr. Raymond and his people, who now feel greatly relieved from their critical situation. Mr. Olney learned from these friendly Indians what we before strongly believed, that the Palouses, Walla Walla, Umatillas, Cayuses, and Stock Whitley's band of De Shutes Indians, were all engaged in the battle on the Walla Walla. These Indians also informed Mr. Olney that after the battle, the Palouses, Walla Walla, and Umatillas have gone partly to the Grand Ronde and partly to the country of the Nez Perces; and Stock Whitley, disgusted with the manner in which the Cayuses fought in the battle, has abandoned them and gone to the Yakima country to join his forces with those of *Kamiakin*. We have now the undisputed possession of the country south of Snake river, and I would suggest the propriety of retaining this possession until such time as it can be occupied by the regular troops. The Indians have left much of their stock behind, which will doubtless be lost to us if we go away. The troops here will not be in a situation for some time to go to the Palouse country, as our horses at present are too much jaded to endure the journey, and we have no boats to cross Snake river, no timber to make them nearer than this place; but I would suggest the propriety of following up the Indians with all possible speed, now that their hopes are blighted and their spirits are broken. Unless this is done they will perhaps rally again.

"To-day [December 14, 1855,] I received a letter from Governor Stevens, dated yesterday,

which I enclose. You will perceive that he is in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war. With his views I fully concur.

"I must earnestly ask that supplies may be sent forward to us without delay. For the last three days none of the volunteers, except the two companies from Fort Henrietta, have had any flour. None is here, and but little at that post. We are now living on beef and potatoes, which are found *en cache*, and the men are becoming much discontented with this mode of living. Clothing for the men is much needed as the winter approaches. To-morrow we will remove to a more suitable point, where grass can be obtained in greater abundance for our worn-out horses. A place has been selected about two miles above Whitman station, on the same (north) side of the Walla Walla, consequently I will abandon this fort, named in honor of Captain Bennett of Company F who now sleeps beneath its stockade, and whose career of usefulness and bravery was here so sadly but nobly closed.

"Very respectfully your obedient servant,

"JAMES K. KELLY,

"Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Left Column."

"W. H. FARRAR,

"Adjutant of Regiment O. M. V.

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Captain Charles Bennett, Company F, killed.
 Lieutenant J. M. Burrows, Company H, killed.
 Private S. S. Van Hagerman, Company I, killed.
 Private — Kelso, Company A, mortally wounded.
 Private Jasper Flemming, Company A, mortally wounded.
 Private Henry Crow, Company H, mortally wounded.
 Private Joseph Sturdevant, Company B, mortally wounded.
 Captain Lyman B. Monson, Company I, wounded.
 Captain A. V. Wilson, Company A, wounded.
 Captain Davis Layton, Company H, wounded.
 Private Casper Snook, Company H, wounded.
 Private T. J. Payne, Company H, wounded.
 Private F. Crabtree, Company H, wounded.
 Private Nathan Fry, Company H, wounded.
 Private Isaac Miller, Company H, wounded.
 Private A. M. Addington, Company H, wounded.
 Private J. B. Gervais, Company K, wounded.
 Private G. W. Smith, Company B, wounded.
 Private Franklin Duval, Company A, wounded.
 Sergeant Major Isaac Miller, wounded.

Of the enemy's loss, Colonel Kelly stated that it was probably 75 killed; that 39 bodies of dead Indians had been found by the volunteers, and that many of their dead were taken from the field.